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A crucial but often neglected aspect of algorithmic fairness is the
question of how we justify enforcing a certain fairness metric from
a moral perspective. When fairness metrics are proposed, they are
typically argued for by highlighting their mathematical properties.
Rarely are the moral assumptions beneath the metric explained.
Our aim in this paper is to consider the moral aspects associated
with the statistical fairness criterion of independence (statistical
parity). To this end, we consider previous work, which discusses the
two worldviews "What You See Is What You Get" (WYSIWYG) and
"We’re All Equal" (WAE) and by doing so provides some guidance
for clarifying the possible assumptions in the design of algorithms.
We present an extension of this work, which centers on morality.
The most natural moral extension is that independence needs to be
fulfilled if and only if differences in predictive features (e.g. high
school grades and standardized test scores are predictive of perfor-
mance at university) between socio-demographic groups are caused
by unjust social disparities or measurement errors. Through two
counterexamples, we demonstrate that this extension is not univer-
sally true. This means that the question of whether independence
should be used or not cannot be satisfactorily answered by only
considering the justness of differences in the predictive features.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A look at current practices suggests that in order to evaluate the
fairness of a given machine learning model, so-called fairness met-
rics have to be computed. However, this disregards the crucial steps
which should precede the calculation of fairness metrics: discussing
the moral reasons underlying the decision to select one or more
fairness metrics to be enforced. This is easily forgotten as the pro-
cedure is not as straightforward as computing statistical metrics. It
might require discussions with the stakeholders of the application
and finding a compromise – after all, there are very few cases where
everyone can agree on the correct choice of fairness metrics, in par-
ticular because it has been shown that some of them are conflicting
[4, 9, 20]. It is thus important to not only provide mathematical
definitions of fairness metrics, but to provide some guidance on
how to reason about them from a moral perspective.
One popular metric is called independence, often referred to as
statistical parity. While existing literature at first sight often seems
to reason about independence in moral terms, a lot of the argu-
ments are either not backed up by moral philosophy or turn out
to be purely mathematical. We note that the need for enforcing
independence is rarely justified from a philosophical perspective,
and that the two spaces (philosophy and mathematics) are often
conflated, in part also due to terminology. In this paper, we want to
make a contribution towards resolving this ambiguity, and to high-
light the relation between mathematical justifications for choosing
independence and the corresponding moral significance.
We begin by defining independence mathematically in Section 2
and then reconstruct arguments on when independence is consid-
ered the correct fairness metric in Section 3. We will show that
these arguments, while at first sight appearing to hold moral value,
are actually purely mathematical if taken literally. However, since
they suggest that there are moral reasons for choosing indepen-
dence, we will provide a natural extension for the arguments found
in the literature (Section 4). We will then argue that this natural
extension is not always in line with our moral intuitions about
fairness in specific cases (Section 5). We conclude in Section 6 that
the question whether independence should be chosen or not is not
sufficiently answered by considering the social injustices occurring
from the birth of an individual to the point where their abilities are
measured.
2 WHAT IS INDEPENDENCE?
The arguably most commonly used category of fairness metrics is
referred to as group fairness and focuses on the question whether
socio-demographic groups are treated similarly or receive similar
outcomes [12, 24]. Group fairness is tested with respect to specific
socio-demographic groups, differentiated through a sensitive at-
tribute, which we will denote as 𝐴. One of the more prominent
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fairness metrics falling into the category of group fairness is statis-
tical parity [4].
The concept is easiest to explain for binary classification (𝑌 ∈
0, 1) and two groups 𝐴 = 𝑎 and 𝐴 ≠ 𝑎: In such a case, statistical
parity requires that the probability of the predicted outcome being
positive, i.e., 𝑌 = 1, is equal for 𝐴 = 𝑎 and 𝐴 ≠ 𝑎. In other words,
the selection rate 𝑃 (𝑌 = 1) has to be independent of the value of
the sensitive attribute. This can be expressed as 𝑃 (𝑌 = 1|𝐴 = 𝑎) =
𝑃 (𝑌 = 1|𝐴 ≠ 𝑎) [38]. This formula can be generalized for the case
of not only a binary predictor, but any predictor 𝑅 and possibly
more values for the sensitive attribute𝐴: 𝑅 ⊥ 𝐴 [4, 26]. This general
proposition is referred to as the fairness criterion independence [4].
Independence can be found implemented in practice, in particular
in the HR domain
1
, and has been particularly influential in the
early stages of the algorithmic fairness literature (see, e.g., [7, 29]).
Together with independence, [4] lists separation and sufficiency
as the three fairness criteria that most fairness metrics that have
been proposed in the literature are closely related to. Separation
and sufficiency gained more attention in recent years through the
debate sparked by Angwin et al.’s investigative articleMachine Bias
[2]. Subsequent publications have pointed out what is now known
as the impossibility theorem: Except for in highly constrained cases,
we can only satisfy one of the three fairness criteria [4, 9, 20]. This
impossibility theorem forces us to pick a specific fairness criterion
to enforce or to find a trade-off between them, which raises the
question of when one criteria should be chosen over the other two.
In this paper, we will focus on the moral reasons for enforcing
independence.
Unsurprisingly, machine learning models trained to optimize,
for example, accuracy, rarely coincidentally fulfill independence.
However, we can enforce independence through various strategies
(see, e.g., [7, 19]). This idea is what we will refer to with the phrase
"independence should be used". We can either enforce achieving
independence fully or partially, e.g., because we want to trade off
fairness with another goal such as business interests, or utilitarian
moral goals such as maximizing the number of lives saved.
3 WHEN SHOULD INDEPENDENCE BE USED?
The question of when independence should be chosen over separa-
tion and sufficiency cannot be answered from a purelymathematical
or technical perspective. Friedler et al. [16] propose a framework
which enables its users to clarify the worldview assumed in the con-
text of their application. This section will discuss Friedler et al.’s
1
The popularity of independence in HR is attributable to the notion of disparate impact
found in the Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures introduced
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1978 [14]. Disparate
impact means that one group is disproportionally affected by e.g. a hiring policy. When
bringing forth a disparate impact claim, the "4/5ths" rule works as a rule of thumb: It
compares the share of hired people from each group. If one group’s hiring rate is less
than 4/5ths of the hiring rate of the other group, then HR might be liable for disparate
impact discrimination [14]. This 4/5ths rule is essentially an expression of statistical
parity that allows for some leeway: Instead of enforcing the perfect equalization of
hiring rates, it allows for some difference in hiring rates. Even though this rule is just a
rule of thumb, Raghavan et al. [31] recently showed that vendors of algorithmic hiring
tools treat it as a hard constraint. The web demo of AIF360 [5], a tool built for the bias
auditing of predictive models, refers to statistical parity as being fulfilled if the 4/5ths
rule is fulfilled. We thus see that through the 4/5ths rule, the notion of independence
is highly relevant in practice.
paper and distill the implicit rules for when to apply independence.
2
We also argue that the framework presented by Friedler et al. is
insufficient to represent the philosophical debate surrounding inde-
pendence and thus propose an extension of their framework.
3.1 Existing Framework
The premise of Friedler et al.’s framework is that when a decision
has to be made by using data-driven predictions, this prediction is
based not on the features that we would ideally have access to, but
on proxies. This is reflected in the main result of [16], which is the
distinction between the following three spaces (see Figure 1a):
• the Construct Space (CS), which consists of the features that
we want to base the decision on,
• the Observed Space (OS), which consists of the features that
we actually base the decision on because the CS is not ob-
servable, so the Observed Space (OS) is our proxy for the CS,
and
• the Decision Space (DS), which encompasses the predictions
based on the OS.
In order to clarify the theoretical explanations, we will work
with an exemplary scenario throughout this paper, which to some
extent has also been used in [16]: hiring. In this case, the task is to
predict employee productivity and take a hiring decision based on
this prediction. We borrow the language for this example from [27].
A company picks whom to hire from the pool of candidates, i.e.,
the people who apply for the job. In order to make this decision,
the company tries to predict who will perform best when hired.
Each candidate brings certain qualifications, based on which the
company wishes to make its choice. However, these qualifications
are not directly observable (e.g., how good they are at selling the
company’s product, how well they fit into the existing team, etc.).
Instead, the company only has access to noisy representations of
these qualifications, which we will refer to as proxies. These proxies
typically include the CV, the motivation letter, the impressions
from the interviews etc. As the company only has access to the
qualifications through the proxies, it has to base its hiring decisions
on the proxies. In this example, the qualifications are equivalent
to the unobservable CS while the proxies represent the observable
OS.
Friedler et al. present two opposing worldviews and advocate for
being transparent about which one the prediction model adheres
to. The two opposing worldviews are:
• "What You See Is What You Get" (WYSIWYG), which as-
sumes that there are barely any differences between the OS
and the CS, meaning that the OS is a good proxy for the
CS. This implies that observed differences between socio-
demographic groups correspond to actual differences. In our
example, that would mean that the usage of CVs, interviews
2
We discuss this particular paper as it uncovers the hidden assumptions that seem to
be held when algorithmic fairness scholars advocate for independence [1]. The paper
is well-known in the field and has influenced both theoretical and practical work.
On the practical side, the two opposing worldviews have been described in AIF360’s
web demo to guide practitioners in their choice of fairness criterion [5]. Theoretical
work has built on Friedler et al.’s framework to, e.g., provide mathematical ways to
interpolate the proposed opposing worldviews [17, 40]. Mitchell et al. [26] cite Friedler
et al.’s reasoning when explaining when enforcing independence should be considered.
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etc. as the proxy for the candidates’ qualifications neither
harms nor benefits one group more than another.
• Measurement Bias (MB), which assumes that the mapping
of individuals from the CS to the OS introduces disparities
between the socio-demographic groups, implying that dif-
ferences between groups in the OS are bigger than in the CS.
For the hiring example, this means that using CVs as proxies
of qualifications harms one group compared to another one.
Friedler et al. refer to the second worldview as structural bias.
However, we will call this worldview MB in order to distinguish it
from the informal usage of the term "structural bias."
Furthermore, Friedler et al. propose the axiom "We’re All Equal"
(WAE), which oftentimes aligns with the worldview MB. WAE
assumes "that in the construct space all groups look essentially the
same" and "that there are no innate differences between groups"
[16, p. 8]. If we assume that there are no innate differences in the
abilities of socio-demographic groups to perform well on a job, but
measure differences once we evaluate their CVs, we will see these
observed differences as a result of the MB. Due to this conceptual
closeness of WAE and MB the literature oftentimes presents "We’re
All Equal" (WAE) and "What You See Is What You Get" (WYSIWYG)
as the two opposing worldviews.
3.2 Our Extension of the Framework
When discussing the cause of group differences in the OS, Friedler
et al.’s framework quickly reaches its limits. The main issue is that
two different spaces are conflated and merged in the CS. Although
Friedler et al. recognize this, they justify not differentiating between
the two by saying that a differentiation would still lead to "the same
mathematical outcome" [16, p. 8].
However, we believe that it is necessary to clearly distinguish
these two spaces as it increases the understanding of the decision
making process and helps navigate the moral assessment. More
specifically, it clarifies at which stage the differences that we observe
between groups in the OS are introduced. This is needed when
discussing the morality of independence as independence looks at
the DS, which of course relies entirely on the OS. Therefore, we
need terms to discuss the causes of difference in OS if we want to
morally justify enforcing independence in the DS.
We base our extension on the work of Rawls [32] who differen-
tiates between realized abilities and innate potential (or, as Rawls
writes, "native endowments"). Potential is innate to an individual
and determined at birth.
3
This could, for example, be their innate
intelligence or predisposition (e.g., extroversion) to develop the
traits for being a good sales person.
4
The realized abilities repre-
sent how good job candidates actually are at making sales at the
time when the company is looking to hire. This may be influenced
by early socialization in the family, the type of school they went
to, the university they attended, the opportunities they were given
3
"At birth" here should be considered as "at conception" since there is already social
influence at the fetal stage [21].
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"[N]ative endowments of various kinds (say, native intelligence or natural ability)
are not fixed natural assets with a constant capacity. They are merely potential and
cannot come to fruition apart form social conditions [...]. Educated and trained abilities
are always a selection [...] from a wide range of possibilities that might have been
fulfilled. Among what affects their realisation are social attitudes of encouragement
and support, and institutions [...], opportunities and social position, and the influence
of good and ill fortune." [32, pp. 56-57]
(internships etc.) and so on. The realized abilities is what we will
keep referring to as the CS in our extension. We introduce a new
space which represents the potential: The Potential Space (PS).
Figure 1b shows the spaces and biases that we differentiate in
our model. The spaces can be understood as different stages: We
start with our innate potential, represented by the Potential Space
(PS), at birth. Shaped by our life experiences, we realize our abilities
to potentially different degrees, which is captured in the CS. The
realized abilities are then measured in the OS. The OS is used as
the basis of the predictions in the DS.
The introduction of the PS gives us the ability to differentiate
between two types of "we’re all equal", which are conflated in
Friedler et al.’s description of WAE. We will define them as distinct
worldviews. Note that besides assuming one of these worldviews,
it is also possible to hold both views at the same time, or neither of
them as they are not opposing.
• "We’re All Equal in the PS" (WAEPS), meaning all groups
have the same innate potential. This means that lacking
Life’s Bias (LB) (which will be defined below), all groups
would have the same realized abilities.
• "We’re All Equal in the CS" (WAECS), meaning all groups
have the same realized abilities (even though it may look
differently when taking measurements). This is the literal
interpretation of "we’re all equal", which implies that all
groups are currently equal in their abilities.
As noted earlier, Friedler et al. formally defineWAE as equality in
the CS, but leave the option that it may also be interpreted as equal-
ity in the PS. We explicitly distinguish the two worldviews as we see
it as necessary for discussing independence from a philosophical
perspective.
The distinction between PS and CS allows us to define another
type of bias. As already stated, Friedler et al. refer to the introduc-
tion of group differences from the CS to the OS as "structural bias"
while we refer to it as MB since it is introduced through the act
of measuring and is dependent on, e.g., availability of information
or variable selection. As seen in Figure 1a, they also term the bias
introducing group differences from the OS to the DS: direct discrim-
ination. We introduce a third bias, which is the bias from the PS to
the CS. Inequalities, such as differences in the qualities of schools
and universities, the income and connections of their parents etc.,
can set individuals with the same potential far apart in terms of
their realized abilities. We will refer to these inequalities as Life’s
Bias (LB). We remain neutral, at this stage, on whether LB is the
same as injustice. We notice, in passing, that if injustice exists, it
may affect LB. For example, if people routinely act based on gender
stereotypes, men and women with the same potential may end up
expressing different realized abilities to a different degree. Further-
more, if acting based on gender stereotypes is morally wrong (as it
seems plausible), LB will be unjust. In cases like this, we shall refer
to LB as unjust LB for precision’s sake.
3.3 Rules Distilled From the Framework
We will now again consider the framework proposed by Friedler
et al. to distill rules about when and why to choose independence as
the fairness measure. The extension of Friedler et al.’s framework










Figure 1: Relationship between the spaces and biases.
presented in the previous section will be used in order to clarify
the position of the paper.
In order to understand Friedler et al.’s reasons for recommending
independence, we have to introduce two key terms that appear in
their proposal: Fairness and non-discrimination. We refer to [16] for
a mathematically precise definition, but the idea can be expressed
as follows:
• Fairness: Individuals who are close in the CS are (fairly) close
in the DS.
5
• Non-discrimination: The difference between groups is not
(notably) increased from the CS to the DS.
In order to avoid confusion with the colloquial way of using
these terms, we will avoid using these terms in any other way than
defined by Friedler et al. If we do use them in the colloquial or
philosophical sense, we will make this evident from here on.
We find that the paper considers the usage of independence from
two perspective: One perspective specifies the assumptions justi-
fying the enforcement of independence (IF [assumption], THEN
independence should be used) and the other one describeswhich
assumptions are impliedwhen enforcing independence is argued for
(IF independence should be used, THEN [assumption]). We
will discuss both perspectives separately and derive a proposition
summarizing them as a single rule.
IF [assumption], THEN independence should be used. The first
perspective asks the question what condition has to be met for sug-
gesting the enforcement of independence. Friedler et al. state that
"under a structural bias worldview, only group fairness mechanisms
achieve non-discrimination (and individual fairness mechanisms
are discriminatory)" [16, p. 12]. Note that "group fairness mecha-
nisms" here refers to algorithms fulfilling independence (and not
any group fairness metric) and that "structural bias" is what we
refer to as MB. This statement should be interpreted to mean that if
we assume MB, only independence can achieve non-discrimination,
but it is not a guarantee. In fact, they present an example in which
MB is assumed, but there are differences in the CS. In this case, en-
forcing independence would still be discriminatory. They conclude
that enforcing independence only guarantees non-discrimination
if WAECS is also assumed.
This leads to the following first rule for Friedler et al.:
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This corresponds to Dwork et al.’s fairness constraint, which requires that "similar
individuals are treated similarly" [12].
Proposition 3.1. IF there is MB6 AND WAECS7,
THEN independence should be used.
IF independence should be used, THEN [assumption]. Friedler et al.
claim that "under a WYSIWYG worldview [i.e., no MB], [...] group
fairness mechanisms [i.e., independence] are unfair" [16, p. 12].
This can be translated as IF WYSIWYG, THEN NOT independence
should be used because we otherwise create unfairness. Since
WYSIWYG is equivalent to NOT there is MB, the rule can be restated
as IF NOT there is MB, THEN NOT independence should be
used. From that we know that independence should only be used if
there is MB. After all, if there is no MB, then independence should
not be used. From this we can follow the other side of the rule: IF
independence should be used, THEN there is MB because we
otherwise create unfairness.
Further, Friedler et al. write that when "the goal is to bring this
difference [between groups in the DS] close to zero, the assumption
is that groups should, as a whole, receive similar outcomes. This
reflects an underlying assumption of the we’re all equal axiom so
that similar group outcomes will be non-discriminatory" [16, p. 14]
Using independence thus also reflects the assumption that WAECS
holds, so IF independence should be used, THEN WAECS.
We follow the second part of the rule as follows:
Proposition 3.2. IF independence should be used, THEN
there is MB AND WAECS.
Merging the rules. Figure 2 shows both rules and the implications









Figure 2: Friedler et al.’s rules for choosing independence.
Note that IFF x, THEN y is equivalent to saying IF x, THEN
y AND IF y THEN x. We can therefore merge Proposition 3.1 and
Proposition 3.2 as follows:
Proposition 3.3. IFF (there is MB AND WAECS),
THEN independence should be used.
To illustrate this rule, let us consider the hiring example intro-
duced in Section 3.1. We first assume that if we split the pool of
candidates into demographic groups, then all groups are on average
equal in their qualifications, e.g., their ability to sell the hiring com-
pany’s product. Second, we assume that standardized test scores
6
What we mean here is "we assume that there is MB". For brevity, however, we will
simply write "there is MB" from now on.
7
Again, we will write "WAECS" to say "we assume that WAECS".
8
We can find similar interpretations of Friedler et al.’s rules in the literature, e.g. in
[6, 26, 39]. While there are subtle differences between their interpretations and ours
(which we lack the space to discuss here in detail), we will show in Section 5 that
whichever interpretation of Friedler et al.’s rules is chosen still falls short of justifying
statistical parity as a general rule.
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shown on the candidates’ CVs distort their actual qualifications. To
illustrate such a case of MB, Friedler et al. recite research, which
calls into question the validity of standardized tests to assess verbal
aptitude across different racial groups [33]. In this case, indepen-
dence should be enforced as both WAECS and MB are given.
Note though that the given reasons for enforcing or not en-
forcing independence ("fairness" and "non-discrimination") are by
definition purely mathematical, not moral. However, the terms still
imply philosophical meaning. Lipton and Steinhardt [22] refer to
the naming of technical concepts with terms that are colloquially
used as suggestive definitions: These terms carry meaning in day-
to-day life and therefore imply that our intuitive understanding
of these terms in some way aligns with their technical definition.
This raises the question of whether these terms aim at not only
providing a purely statistical reasoning about independence, but
also a moral one. As demonstrated above, if we interpret the paper
literally, then it only provides mathematical justifications for the
introduced rule. However, since the DS includes predictions that
are used to make potentially life-altering decisions, it is hard to
see how the rule could only be concerned with the mathematical
validity of the predictions without any further moral considera-
tions. In the next section, we will therefore consider the natural
extension of Proposition 3.3: We will view it as providing moral
reasons for/against enforcing independence.
9
In doing so, we must
consider all spaces introduced in Section 3.2. The moral rules that
we introduce therefore include not only WAECS and MB, but also
WAEPS and LB.
4 DEALINGWITH LB
As we have shown, the literal interpretation of the WAE worldview
states that all groups are actually the same in the CS, even though
it may look differently when taking measurements. We should,
however, consider what follows from assuming theWAEworldview
at the PS level, while allowing for the existence of LB. Clearly, the
result may be that we are no longer all equal in the CS since LB
may affect members of different groups in different ways.
4.1 Two Ways of Dealing With LB in Distilled
Rules
We will now discuss how LB may be included in the rules proposed
by Friedler et al. The first way of dealing with LB in Proposition 3.3
is to preserve the rule and simply apply it the same way when
there is LB. This approach does not consider morality and instead
prioritizes Friedler et al.’s [16] original reasoning about mathemat-
ical properties. These properties are what "fairness" (in its moral
sense) is ultimately reduced to when dealing with LB this way. The
second way of including LB in the rule is to extend it and make the
argument a moral one. For this, we extend the rule to the new type
of bias, LB, by arguing by analogy: one could reason that LB – in
terms of its moral features – is sufficiently similar to MB, so that
similar rules follow when there is LB instead of MB or both. Indeed,
the analogy between MB and LB will be stronger if we can identify
a common moral principle that applies to both cases.
Let us now examine both ways for dealing with LB in turn.
9
Binns’s interpretation in [6] considers this moralized version.
4.1.1 The mathematical extension. Under this extension, we simply
apply the rules that we distilled from Friedler et al.’s framework, in-
dependently of whether there is LB or not. Proposition 3.3 states that
IFF (there is MB AND WAECS), THEN independence should
be used. In order to see how this rule plays out when there is
LB, we consider the case where WAEPS and inequalities in the CS
are caused by LB. This means that by hypothesis NOT WAECS. It
follows from Proposition 3.3 that independence should not be used
in this case. The reasoning consistent with Friedler et al. would be:
If WAECS is not assumed, enforcing independence violates Friedler
et al.’s mathematical fairness property (that individuals close in
the CS should be close in the DS) – independently of whether they
are equal in the PS or not. This line of argument may, however,
leave scholars that are interested in fairness (in its moral sense, not
Friedler et al.’s statistical concept) dissatisfied.
4.1.2 The moral extension. In [16], the argument in favor of fair-
ness does not provide an explicit moral grounding to define fairness
the way it is defined. This definition of fairness is explicitly inspired
by Dwork et al.’s [12] notion, which relies on similarity in the CS to
determine what makes a decision fair. However, it may be objected
that similarities in the CS under the influence of injustice do not
provide a suitable reference point to define what is a fair prediction
or decision [6].
To see this, let us consider the case of credit lending described
by Reuben Binns in [6]. We assume that we observe in the OS that
women have historically been less likely to repay their loans than
men. Binns provides two possible reasons for this. The first is that
credit lenders may be more lenient towards men, allowing them
delays in their repayment. This can be interpreted as MB: Women
and men who are equally "good" at repaying their loans end up with
different credit histories (which are proxies for their repayment
ability) as men are treated preferentially. A second reason could be
that women are more likely to be single parents, which makes the
repayment of credits more difficult. This is an example of LB: Due
to societal structures, the average woman is less likely to repay her
loan.
The question is then whether differences in the OS between men
and women (i.e., their credit histories) should be considered to be
just. Binns argues that if they are not considered to be just (e.g.,
because they are unjustly caused by gendered social structures),
then enforcing independence should be considered.
We may argue that both of the given reasons for the difference
in the payment history (the existence of MB and LB) are unjust.
First, we could say that it is unjust (and not merely, inefficient)
for a decision about the individual to be taken when MB exists.
Second, we may argue that it is unjust (and not merely, inefficient)
for a decision about the individual to be taken when LB exists. This
suggests that there is a common moral reason for why decisions
influenced by MB or LB are unfair. We will now attempt to identify
this common moral cause.
For this, we will follow the philosophical analysis, which is ex-
plicitly invoked by Binns. This analysis will explain why both MB
and LB cause unfair predictions and decisions. It appeals to the
question of responsibility which asks whether individuals are re-
sponsible for predictions others make about them that impact their
well-being. This responsibility may fail to obtain either because the
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measurements that decision-makers have (the OS) do not reflect
people’s choices (i.e., people are not responsible for MB) or because
the construct that is measured (the CS) does not reflect people’s
choices (or both). Thus, one should ask whether the OS or the CS
is the result of choices or of circumstances individuals cannot con-
trol.
10
When MB exists, the individuals who are judged in a biased
manner do not control the bias and are not morally responsible for
it. Intuitively, it is unfair that individuals are imposed costs due to
factors for which they are not responsible. We can thus describe
the moral view behind proposition Proposition 3.3 in the following
way: if WAECS and MB is assumed, then differences in the DS are
unjust on responsibility grounds.
Similarly, one may consider people’s actual abilities and behav-
iors as responses to the peculiar circumstances in which people
happen to be born and grow up (which are not up to them). Thus,
people are not responsible for the influence of those peculiar circum-
stances, i.e., for their LB. It follows that people should not benefit
or get harmed or, more generally, be treated differently because of
LB, which manifests itself in the CS. Hence, by parity of reasoning
– according to the above moral interpretation of Proposition 3.3
– if we seek to eliminate the influence of MB on the decision, we
should also seek to eliminate the influence of LB on the decision.
Conclusion of the moral extension. This suggests the following
view as the natural extension of Proposition 3.3, i.e., the view that
IFF (there is MB AND WAECS), THEN independence should
be used:
Proposition 4.1. IFF WAEPS AND (there is MB OR11 there
is LB), THEN independence should be used.
4.2 Not All LB Should Be Corrected
Intuitively, Proposition 4.1 states that independence is called for not
only to correct for MB, but also to correct for LB. Notice that Propo-
sition 4.1 is now arguably too broad in the inequalities it promises
to correct for. The moral argument for removing the influence of
MB was that it was neither morally neutral, nor merely inefficient,
but actually unjust as it does not reflect merit or responsibility.
Something similar, intuitively, must hold in this case. Namely, it is
unjust LB that calls for some kind of correction or rectification.
4.2.1 Distinction between just and unjust LB. Note that it is a logi-
cal possibility that indeed all LB, as such, is unjust. If so, there is no
distinction between unjust LB and LB simpliciter. This is the posi-
tion that no one deserves the values in the CS which are influenced
by any type of LB. It is, however, also possible to maintain a more
nuanced view. It is easy to show this by considering theories of
justice that political philosophers actually defend. Different substan-
tive theories of justice provide different (and often irreconcilable)
criteria for evaluating the justice of social structures. For example,
10
In addition, in the case ofMB (but not LB), a distinctmoral argument can be given as to
why a decision affected byMB is unfair, which is based onmerit. The conventional view
of merit is that it is based on what people do [25, 28], for example, their contribution
to society. Suppose that the actual contribution to society of two people, A and B, is
equal, that is A and B have the same CS features. However, MB exists, so A is perceived
to contribute more and, consequently, A receives a benefit that is denied to B. This is
intuitively unfair since A does not deserve a favorable treatment compared to B (A
has not contributed more to society than B).
11
When using OR, we are referring to the logical operator ∨, which means that the
statement is true if either one or both operands are true.
institutional luck egalitarianism maintains that all inequalities (in
the metric of what matters ultimately for justice, e.g. well-being)
for which individuals are not responsible are unjust [10, 13]. Un-
just inequalities are the ones which could have been prevented
or redressed through suitable and feasible institutional arrange-
ments. Rawls’s theory of justice, on the other hand, maintains that
inequalities reflecting people’s unequal native endowments and
motivations are just – provided that (1) they are not influenced
by the social class of birth and (2) emerge through institutions ar-
ranged in a way that delivers the greatest expectations of social
primary goods to society’s least advantaged members [32].
These theories (and many others) disagree when arguing about
the justice of institutions. The luck egalitarian one, for example,
commits the government to do everything it can to level the playing
field among individuals born with unequal natural endowments, as
these inequalities are undeserved. Rawls’s view, however, approves
of such inequalities if they boost productivity in a society where
people at the bottom of the social pyramid are the ones to benefit
the most from such productivity gains [32]. Yet these views also
converge on many real world cases: for example, current US society
is arguably very unjust according to both views.
From the perspective of both luck egalitarianism and Rawls’s
theory of justice, many inequalities in the CS, which are produced
by LB, actually reflect unjust social structures. They are instances of
unjust LB. Notice that neither theory implies that all LB is unjust LB.
Let us consider the luck egalitarian view that only factors for which
one can be held morally responsible justify inequality. It may still
be objected that the development of innate potential into realized
abilities is not determined entirely by external circumstances that
are matters of brute (good or bad) luck. Apart from the influence
of good and ill fortune, our realized abilities reflect our personal
history, i.e., the choices we make, every day. If human agency is not
an illusion, we are (partially, at least) responsible for at least some of
our choices. Therefore, at least some LB is not morally problematic.
It is therefore unclear why one should treat inequalities arising in
the CS as a result of such LB on a par with inequalities arising in
the OS due to MB.
4.2.2 Just LB at group-level. In the discussion above, we are saying
that not all LB is necessarily unjust because some LB might simply
be caused by personal choices. However, one may question whether
it is possible for personal choices to cause unequal outcomes not
only between individuals, but also at the group level, even if there
were no inequalities in the PS. For example, two people with the
same potential, with institutions that only let inequalities reflecting
their individual choices exist, could still end up with different real-
ized abilities. Yet, on a group level, it seems improbable that one
group justly has a statistical prevalence of individuals making one
kind of choices, for which they can be held responsible, and another
group justly has a statistical prevalence of individuals making a
different kind of choice. If that different prevalence exists and we
assume WAEPS, certainly there must be something causing the
group inequality for which individuals cannot and shall not be held
responsible. The question is, therefore, whether just LB is actually
possible on a group-level (which is the relevant level when talking
about enforcing independence).
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In reply, there are at least two ways of showing the possibility
of just LB. First, we consider moral views that differ from luck
egalitarianism. Consider the view that the influence of parents
who read bedtime stories to their children and in this way cause
unequal IQ, i.e., differences in the OS, is never unjust [23], a view
that contradicts luck egalitarianism [36]. If that view is correct,
inequalities that have been created by reading bedtime stories to
children are not unjust even if it so happens that, for historical
and cultural reasons, reading bedtime stories to children is more
habitual in certain cultures than others.
Second, just LB may exist under a luck egalitarian view if we do
not assume WAEPS. Let us consider the case of a genetic disease
which is more common in a specific population due to the founder
effect. Spending more resources on the detection and treatment
of this disease for the population that is most affected (e.g., more
medical check-ups, financial support for therapies) is by definition
a form of LB. This is because if we assumedWAEPS, investing more
in the detection and treatment of this disease for people in the par-
ticularly affected population is the sort of circumstance that would
create inequalities in the CS, i.e. the rest of the population would
on average suffer more from the effects of the disease. However, in
a world in which we are not all equal in the PS (as is the case with
this genetic disease), the increased spending on the more affected
population could plausibly be seen as a case of just LB. Under a luck
egalitarian view of justice, for example, this LB would clearly be just
because it mitigates an inequality in the CS for which individuals
are not morally responsible (i.e., that without intervention, one
group is more likely to suffer from the disease).
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When LB exists, but is not unjust, the moral reason for enforc-
ing independence no longer holds. In other words, the decision
whether independence should be used depends not only on facts
but also on values when LB exists. According to luck egalitarianism,
independence is not required if the following two requirements are
fulfilled: (1) unequal decisions (i.e., inequality in the DS) emerge
purely as a result of unbiased observations (i.e., WYSIWYG) of the
features that we want to base the decision on (i.e., CS) and (2) these
features are unequally distributed (in spite of equality of potential
in the PS) simply as a result of choices for which individuals can be
considered fully responsible. According to other theories of justice,
independence is not required if the features in question emerge
as a result of processes such as reading bedtime stories to one’s
children. Whether independence should be enforced or not thus
depends on one’s view of what LB is just.
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Understanding this difference between just and unjust LB can help us understand how
our extension of Friedler et al.’s framework relates to Mitchell et al.’s [26] proposition
to differentiate between two notions of biased data: "statistical bias" and "societal
bias". "Statistical bias" occurs between what they refer to as the "world as it is" (i.e.,
the CS) and the "world according to data" (i.e., the OS). It is thus simply another
term for MB. "Societal bias" is introduced from the "world as it should and could be"
to the "world as it is". One may think that the "world as it should and could be" is
equivalent to our PS and that "societal bias" is thus equivalent to LB. However, the PS
is a purely descriptive notion while the "world as it should and could be", while never
defined, suggests a normative concept: To define what the world ought to look like, a
philosophical concept is needed. Such a philosophical concept might morally require
the introduction of just LB that ensures that the "world as it is" reflects the "world
as it should and could be". In this case, our reading of Mitchell et al. is that there is
no "societal bias" whereas our model would note that there is LB, but that this LB is
just. Our extension thus gives us the tools to describe the existence LB without yet
making normative judgments about it. Such normative judgments are only required
when differentiating just from unjust LB.
4.3 Extended Rules: Final Formulation
We have argued that if we consider LB, we should consider a mor-
alized version of the relation between LB and independence (i.e.,
not all forms of LB require to be corrected). As we have shown, the
theory of justice one adheres to determines one’s judgment about
the justness of the LB. This in turn determines one’s judgment as
to whether LB provides a reason to enforce independence or not.
In conclusion: the most charitable interpretation of the extension
of Proposition 3.3 to include LB is not Proposition 4.1, but rather
the following more nuanced view:
Proposition 4.2. IFF WAEPS AND (there is MB OR there
is unjust LB), THEN independence should be used.
In what follows, we will consider Proposition 4.2 as a natural ex-
tension of Proposition 3.3. However, we want to focus our attention
on the implications of Proposition 4.2 in the scenario in which MB
does not exist in order to simplify our discussion somewhat. We
will refer to the remaining underlying assumptions as the "We’re
All Equal But There Is Injustice" (WAEBI) worldview.
Definition 4.1 (WAEBI worldview). The WAEBI worldview sub-
sumes the following assumptions:
(1) WAEPS and
(2) there is unjust LB.
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Proposition 4.3 follows from Proposition 4.2 if it is assumed that
there is no MB.
Proposition 4.3. IFF WAEBI, THEN independence should
be used.
In the hiring example, WAEBI is given if, for example, (1) at birth,
all demographic groups have the same average potential to become
hireworthy sales people, but (2) this equality is lost because one
group has, on average, less money and is thus more likely to have
to work odd jobs instead of doing unpaid internships. The resulting
differences in the candidates’ qualifications and proxies like their
CV are thus considered to be unjust and should be corrected by
enforcing independence.
5 TWO COUNTEREXAMPLES AGAINST
EXTENDED RULES
We will now examine if Proposition 4.2 holds up as a general rule
for when to enforce independence. Clearly, it does not represent a
general rule if we can find cases in which this rule does not apply.
The goal of this section is to see if we can find such cases.
As stated before, we focus our search for counterexamples on
Proposition 4.3, which simplifies the discussion of Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.3 is the claim that IFF WAEBI, THEN independence
should be used. When we assume that there is no MB, Proposi-
tion 4.3 is true if and only if Proposition 4.2 is true. Thus, we can
simplify the analysis of Proposition 4.2 somewhat by focusing on
Proposition 4.3, assuming that no MB exists. We shall proceed in a
logical fashion by investigating the two parts of the biconditional
in turn:
(1) IF WAEBI, THEN independence should be used and
13
Note that this second assumption logically leads to the assumption of unjust inequal-
ities in the CS.
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(2) IF independence should be used, THEN WAEBI
Notice that rule 2 is informative, even though we already know
that it is incorrect because independence should also be used when
MB exists, even if WAEBI is not assumed. The reason why it is
still informative is that we will show that the claim is incorrect –
independently of MB.
We argue against both rule 1 and 2 by counterexample. The
counterexampleswill shownot only that Proposition 4.3 is incorrect,
but also that Proposition 4.2 is since the counterexamples do not
involveMB. Thus, we refer to Proposition 4.3, so that we can bracket
the issue of MB and avoid distractions.
5.1 Counterexample Against Rule 1: IF WAEBI,
THEN independence should be used
It is now time to offer a convincing counterexample to the view that
(absent MB) independence should be enforced if WAEBI. For this,
recall the definition of WAEBI, Definition 4.1, which states that this
worldview assumes WAEPS and unjust LB. The counterexample
is a case in which the WAEBI assumptions are all satisfied, yet
independence is not required. One can build a counterexample as
follows:
(1) First, let us suppose that there is a specific severe congeni-
tal disorder that is very painful and drastically reduces the
individual’s life expectancy. We will refer to this specific
severe congenital disorder as SCD. Let us further assume
that (probably contrary to fact) all individuals are generally
equally at risk of being born with SCD. WAEPS is therefore
satisfied.
(2) Second, let us suppose that – while the risk for being born
with SCD is generally the same for all individuals – this risk
is notably increased when the mother breathes in danger-
ous pollutants during pregnancy. Assume now that mothers
in one group, e.g. the green group, are more likely to live
in neighborhoods close to chemical factories that emit dan-
gerous pollutants. Individuals in the green group are thus
more likely to be exposed to the risk of developing SCD.
We shall suppose that this unequal exposure is produced by
huge and uncontroversial injustices in society. Green moth-
ers might, for example, be more likely to live in poverty
because of direct discrimination against them, which makes
their opportunities for all sorts of job worse than those of
the orange group. For this reason, they cannot afford moving
and have to live in poor neighborhoods plagued by danger-
ous pollutants. (This case plausibly counts as injustice even
according to more moderate forms of egalitarianism than
luck egalitarianism.) Hence, there is unjust LB.
(3) Third, as a result of 2, members of the green group are more
likely to suffer from SCD than members of the orange group.
Thus, there is an unjust inequality in the CS. We shall sup-
pose that whether a patient suffers from SCD is a clear cut,
binary condition, i.e., either someone does, or does not. There
are no intermediate stages.
Suppose that a very expensive therapy is developed, which cures
people with SCD but causes recurrent migraine (with moderate fre-
quency, let us say, once per month). As SCD has bad consequences
for the individual (pain, drastically shortened life), we shall assume
that the benefits of the therapy outweigh its costs. Suppose now
that the therapy only works if it affects fetal development. Thus, in
order to avoid the disease for the future individual, it is the mother
that has to be treated before the illness is fully manifested in the
child.
Suppose that machine learning specialists develop a perfect ac-
curacy predictor to determine, based on a non-invasive clinical
examination, whether the fetus will be ill. (This may be impossible
in practice. However, in a philosophical argument, we can test the
theory also with hypothetical examples. The challenge is to explain
what could be morally wrong with the independence-fulfilling pre-
dictor. Notice also that in the clinical setting one can already make
high accuracy predictions. With close to perfect accuracy, people
often act and reason as if the accuracy was perfect.) Since the pre-
dictor is perfectly accurate, it will predict SCD at a higher rate for
the green than for the orange patients. As a result, green patients
will receive the therapy more often than orange patients do, which
violates independence.
We will now argue that this perfect accuracy predictor is per-
fectly just. The argument we present is very robust because it is
coherent with ethical views that sometimes pull in different di-
rections and, intuitively, it is difficult to make the case that the
argument is wrong. Indeed, it should be so obvious that the predic-
tor is fair, that it would be counted against any view entailing the
opposite for this case, that it cannot align with this result. The deci-
sion of the perfect predictor is perfectly fair because no individual
has a claim against the distribution based on it. By "no individual
has a claim", we do not mean that some individual may have a
prima facie claim that a different decision should be taken, which
is then overridden by the claims of others. We also do not mean
that some individual has a claim that holds prima facie, but that is
defeated by some substantive view of justice, which the individual,
if reasonable or endowed with moral sensibility, should respect
(even if it is not in the individual’s own interest to respect it). What
we actually mean by "no individual has a claim" is the much more
radical claim that the individual has no claim against the perfectly
accurate distribution (in this case), not even a pro tanto or a prima
facie claim.
To see why no individual has a claim against the perfect accuracy
distribution, consider that no individual, faced with the decision by
a perfect predictor, can point to an alternative distribution that they
have any reason to prefer. This clearly is the case in the example.
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For, first, each individual person who will develop SCD is better
off with a decision based on the correct prediction because the
individual is certain to receive the cure, which is the preferable
outcome despite the side effects. Second, every individual who
will not develop SCD is better off without the therapy because the
individual is certain to not need the cure. Not receiving the therapy
is thus the preferable outcome as it avoids the side effects. As a
consequence, no one has a claim to a different decision.
Moreover, any departure from the perfect accuracy predictor
makes someone worse off and no one better off. When the fea-
tures in the CS are not equally distributed between the two groups
14
It may be objected that this is a very peculiar example, and that not all cases involving
perfect accuracy predictors are relevantly similar. That is probably correct. However,
one case is all it takes to generate a counterexample that falsifies a general claim about
when independence should be used.
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(i.e., green and orange, in this case), enforcing independence sacri-
fices some accuracy. Suppose that this sacrifice amounts to a single
wrong diagnosis. That means: either someone who will actually
develop SCD will not receive the cure, or someone who will not
develop SCD will receive the cure. Either way, the choice to enforce
independence will cause harm to at least one individual, which
gives that individual a claim against independence. It seems that
this is one rare case in which one view of what is fair is truly ro-
bust because, besides maximizing utility, no individual has a claim
against the perfect accuracy predictor, even if it violates indepen-
dence. Furthermore, if independence is enforced in this case even
though it causes inaccuracy, there will be at least one individual
who has a moral claim against independence being enforced. This
claim entails that enforcing independence is morally wrong because
it is not defeated by any claim in favor of enforcing independence.
The question of comparing the relative urgency or strength of moral
claims does not even arise.
Our argument here is not merely that independence in this case
involves a loss of accuracy (and thus utility) and that, simply for
that reason, is the morally wrong choice in this case. While it is
correct that there is a conflict between independence and accuracy
in this case, our argument is much stronger than the usual utilitarian
argument. The usual utilitarian argument points out that enforcing
independence causes a loss of aggregate utility [11]. This argument
also focuses on utility, but it considers it from the perspective of
each and every individual involved in the decision. A utilitarian
argument would object that enforcing independence causes a utility
loss in the aggregate and that for that reason it should not be done.
However, such an argument also requires that, in order to reach
the utilitarian maximum, some people are made worse off for the
benefit of other people. The utilitarian view is that this is always
morally right when the sum of utility is maximized. Many people
find this view objectionable (e.g., [32]). The objection against the
utilitarian is that it does not respect the separateness of persons [32].
Our argument against independence does not imply the utilitarian
conclusion, so it is is not vulnerable to this objection.
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Summing up, it is not true that IF WAEBI, THEN independence
should be used. In this case, WAEBI is clearly satisfied (by hy-
pothesis), and yet independence should not be used.
5.2 Counterexample Against Rule 2: IF
independence should be used, THEN
WAEBI
Now let us turn to the other direction of the biconditional, which is
the idea that IF independence should be used, THEN WAEBI is
assumed. A counterexample to this would be a case in which inde-
pendence seems intuitively fair or called for, yet WAEBI conditions
are not satisfied. Unfortunately, this example is not as robust as
the first one is. The example itself is inspired by a fairness theory
for machine learning, which is based on economic and political
theories of equality of opportunity and which provides indications
for when independence should be used [18]. We do not rely on this
15
Our argument is a contractualist one, not a utilitarian one [34]. Our thesis that the
perfect accuracy predictor is just is so robust because it is independently supported by
contractualism and utilitarianism.
theory, as we find that a strong case can be made for the conclusion
on intuitive grounds.
We consider the design of an algorithmic decision system de-
ployed after natural disasters. This decision system is tasked with
determining where drones should be sent in order to attempt to
rescue civilians from drowning after their houses and streets have
been flooded. Data scientists train a machine learning model to
decide where to send the drones in such cases. The initial goal is to
simply maximize the number of lives saved.
Let us assume that there is a flooding which affects a city with
its surrounding suburbs. While the city is densely populated, the
suburbs are not. We can split the population into two demographic
groups: the green and the orange group. It turns out that the orange
group tends to live in the city and the green group tends to live
in the suburbs. Because of the difference in population density be-
tween the city and the suburbs, a drone that is sent to the city has a
much higher probability of resulting in a successful rescue. Hence,
the utility-maximizing model is more likely to send drones to the
densely populated city than to the suburbs – it diverts resources
to the suburbs only when a large proportion in the cities has been
saved. As a consequence, the probability to be saved is much higher
(say, ten times higher) if you are orange. This means that mem-
bers of the green population are very unlikely to be rescued.16 We
maintain that in this case independence is morally required. The
reasoning is the following: Every individual equally needs to be
saved, independently of where they live, and no one should be held
morally responsible for failing to live in a relatively densely popu-
lated area, for matters of life and death. Thus, in a sense, everyone
equally deserves to be saved. If everyone equally deserves to be
rescued, everyone should have the same prospects of being rescued,
independently of their sex, race, or any other sensitive attribute.
If so, any inequality in the probability of rescue associated with
membership to a group is morally problematic, for it cannot be
justified based on merit, or need, or responsibility.
It may be objected that there is a clear moral reason to prioritize
saving urban individuals, namely that this will maximize the total
number of lives rescued (and we ought to maximize this value).
However, notice again, that this is a utilitarian, maximizing argu-
ment. Most moral problems of fairness in machine learning, or at
least mostmorally deep problems, emerge because there is a conflict
between maximizing utility and fairness (in its moral sense) defined
in a way that is independent from it. Hence, in a sense, the fact that
the fairness intuition conflicts with a utilitarian assessment of what
should be done is to be expected for an authentic (non-utilitarian)
moral intuition for fairness. Arguably, the best way to take the
utilitarian intuition – that there is a (moral) reason to send drones
predominantly into the densely populated areas – into account is
by viewing it as a consideration of efficiency that an ethically sound
procedure should balance with considerations of distributive justice.
That is, the all-things-considered morally desirable algorithm will
neither be one that maximizes utility, nor one that achieves indepen-
dence fully, but rather something in between, that will compromise
utility, to some extent, but also achieve a more balanced rescue of
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Clearly we assume here that data scientists cannot reach, or even approximate, a
perfect accuracy predictor. This implies that when the algorithm predicts that a person
will be saved by sending a helicopter to coordinates 𝑋 , 𝑌 , 𝑍 , it is not always the case
that someone will get rescued, particularly in the suburbs.
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the two populations. We then conclude that this is a case in which
independence should be used due to a concern with fairness (in its
moral sense). (Even if, let us grant the objection, not fully achieved
as fairness needs to be balanced with efficiency.)
Having argued that independence should be used, this amounts
to the counterexample we are looking for if we show that the moral
case for independence is independent of the WAEBI conditions.
For building the stronger possible case, we shall suppose that every
single one of the conditions that jointly define theWAEBI worldview
is false.
First, we do not assume that WAEPS, that is, people are born
with a disposition to live in cities or suburbs. For example, some
people live in the city just because they are born there, even if it is
not true of everyone.
Second, it is not the case that LB exists, or at least, the plausibility
of the conclusion about fairness does not depend on the existence
of LB. We may consider, for the sake of the argument, a society
in which people are not pressured to live in cities. The case for
rescuing the people in the suburbs is as strong in a society in which
people are not pressured to live in cities, as it is in one in which
they are pressured to do so (among other things, by the perception
that their lives have less value in the eyes of rescue drones if they
remain in less densely populated areas). So the conclusion does not
depend on the existence of LB.
Third, we may as well suppose that there is LB, but the LB
is not unjust. For example, people end up living in suburbs and
cities (and different groups, e.g., green and orange, have different
propensities to do so), but this is not in itself unjust or the result of
injustice in society. Schelling’s model of segregation shows that a
mild preference for living among members of the same group will
over time lead to segregation [35]. For this example, we assume
that the green and orange population have a slight preference for
members of their own group and that this preference is innate and
not caused by injustices. Over time the two groups have segregated
to some extent, so that the majority of the people living in the city
happens to be orange and the majority of the people living in the
suburbs is green.17
In conclusion, we have identified a case in which independence
should (plausibly) be used. And yet, in this case, the conditions
realizing the WAEBI worldview are not satisfied. This counts as a
counterexample to the claim that IF independence should be
used, THEN WAEBI, and concludes our rebuttal of the bicondi-
tional claim Proposition 4.3. Since neither example depends on the
existence of MB, the arguments also disprove Proposition 4.2.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed one argument that can be given in
support of enforcing independence in a machine learning model,
found in the recent machine learning literature. This argument
claims that one shall enforce independence (i.e., use it as a fairness
constraint of the model) if (and only if) "We’re All Equal" (WAE) and
there is Measurement Bias (MB). We have introduced the concept of
Life’s Bias (LB) as a type of bias, which influences how the potential
an individual is born with develops into realized abilities. This bias
can be distinguished from the MB proposed by Friedler et al. (They
17
For examples of unjust causes of segregation see [3, 8, 15, 30, 37].
call this type of bias "structural bias".) This shows that the WAE
view as stated in the literature is incomplete as demographic groups
can be equal not only with respect to their realized abilities but also
their potential.
We have identified two possible extensions of the argument pre-
sented in the literature, which are relevant when inequalities are
generated by LB. We argue that the most (morally) plausible ex-
tension is the view that one should enforce independence if (and
only if) there is MB or if "We’re All Equal But There Is Injustice"
(WAEBI). In other words, it seems like independence could be jus-
tified when taking on the WAEBI worldview, which assumes that
socio-demographic groups have similar innate potential at birth,
but unjust LB leads to differences in their realized abilities.
Unfortunately, we found two powerful counterexamples to this
ideally simple view: the first clearly showed that unjust LB does
not always morally require enforcing independence; the second
made it plausible that (even in the absence of MB) injustice is not
required for the use of independence to be morally justified.
The relatively simple and morally plausible proposition linking
WAEBI and independence we analyzed here is thus not universally
true. One may object to the first counterexample, saying that it
presents a case where what is being distributed is not (uniformly)
beneficial, that is, the treatment would be a net harm for many
of the subjects. However, it is true of many cases discussed in the
algorithmic fairness debate that what is being distributed is not
uniformly beneficial: arguably, even being admitted to a university
that is too demanding for one’s skills might be harmful and being
released on parole may not be beneficial for the parolee who in fact
reoffends and re-enters prison with a worse criminal record. One
may further object that in the first counterexample, considering
efficiency alone would produce a fair outcome. We argue that if
there are cases in which the efficient solution is clearly and intu-
itively considered the fair solution, we need a philosophical theory
that can explain why this is in fact the case. Our argument thus
reveals that a promising line of research may be built by judging
the morality of fairness metrics not only based on the question of
what causes differences in predictions, but also based on how these
predictions distribute utility.
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